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Research Question 
China-Africa Policy of non-interference in the 21 Century: Opportunity for growth or 
exploitation 
Abstract 
The 21 century has seen the dramatic increase in African-Chinese engagement, with a 
significant increase in both political and economic interaction. The changing international 
political and economic reality has seen China become the biggest economy in the world, in 
terms of purchasing power parity, and substantially increase its footprint in Africa. The 
increased developing relationship of African-Chinese interactions has brought fourth both 
criticisms and conversations of opportunity. Both arguments focusing on understanding the 
nature of the relationship and exploring whether the interactions can be seen as being 
exploitative or a partnership in growth. A look at the importance of this relationship cannot 
be complete without first analysing Africa’s historical and current relationship with its 
Western counterparts. Secondly the research paper looks at Africa’s place in the current 
international political economy and why the new prospering African-Chinese relationship 
presents opportunities. This is essentially what the paper seeks to understand and discuss, 
looking primarily at the role the Chinese policy of non-interference can play with regards to 
African states development path and understanding its role in the context of Africa position in 
the global political economy. 
Key words: Sino-Africa, Policy of Non-interference, Exploitation, Eurocentricism, neo-
liberalism    
Introduction 
The evolving nature of African-Chinese relations in the 21st century has been a topic of much 
interest as African and Chinese economic and political interactions continue to strengthen. 
This reality has drawn much attention by international relations scholars; bringing about a 
large body of work that mainly focus on whether the relation is one of inherent self-interest 
and exploitation or whether the interactions presents an alternative that gives African states a 
unique opportunity to experience independent and home-grown political and economic 
experiences. The purpose of the essay to monitor the evolving nature of African-Chinese 
relations from an African perspective and detailing whether the political relationship, in 
particular the policy of non-interference, can be described as exploitative or a policy which 
presents African states an opportunity for growth.  
The research paper begins by briefly explaining the history and understanding of the Chinese 
policy of non-interference. The paper discusses the principles underlying the policy of non-
interference set down by Then People’s Republic of China’s Premier Zhou Enlai at the 
Bandung Conference in 1955, being respect of sovereignty of others, non-aggression and 
peaceful co-existence.1 Secondly the paper gives an in-depth discussion on the historical 
relationship Africa has had with China, particularly with regards to the policy of non-
                                                          
1  “Is China's non-interference policy sustainable?” http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-24100629, 17 September 2013. 
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interference. The paper looks at the China’s model of interaction with Africa, which has no 
colonial past and states no explicit political agenda. I also look at China’s official policy 
statements, with particular interest in China’s “respect of African countries” choice of a 
political system and development path based on the internal domestic realties of that state. 2   
The paper then goes on to discuss the primary focus of the research, being whether the 
Chinese policy of non-interference within the context of the 21 century presents an 
opportunity for an African unique state lead developmental growth that takes domestic 
realties into consideration. Or whether they use of the policy of non-interference by China is 
primary undermining “international” efforts to increase transparency and good governance, 
looking at many of the Western led initiatives from the initial structural adjustment policies to 
the 21st century ideals of good governance. The paper essentially looks at the policy of 
Western led initiatives and how they continue, although not completely in rhetoric, to dictate 
a neo-liberal policy agenda in African states thus reducing and impacting their sovereignty 
and ability to make independent political, social and economic decisions.  
The research paper then breifly focuses in on Sino-Sudanese relations, with the inclusion of 
South Sudan as a new political context. The paper explains the importance of Sudan as a case 
study for the understanding of Chinese relations with other various African states. Central to 
Sino-African relations has been Chinese policy of non-interference with domestic political 
affairs being seen as needing to be respected by other states. The debate around China’s 
interaction with Sudan is a microcosm of the debate that is being had about Sino-Africa 
relations, being that China using its policy of non-interference as a justification for supporting 
authoritarian corrupt regimes for the purpose of pursuing business interests. With the other 
view being that the Chinese policy absence of patronising conditionality’s has and gives the 
opportunity for many positive outcomes. Lastly the research paper argues that the debate for 
Sino-African relations presents an opportunity for growth and the overall positive aspects of 
the relations present far more benefits than the conditionality’s placed by Western states and 
Western led International organisations. 
Methodology 
Definitions  
Chinese non-intervention: This policy is essentially derived from the principles 
communicated by then Premier Zhou Enlai at the Bandung Peace Conference in 1955. There 
are essentially five core principles. The first being mutual respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in one another’s international 
affairs, quality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.  
Opportunity for growth: Does the Chinese policy of non-intervention give African states a 
unique opportunity to experience independent and home-grown political and economic 
                                                          
2 Condon, M. 2012. China in Africa: What the Policy of Non-intervention Adds to the Western Development Dilemma, The Fletcher 
Journal of Human Security. Available at: http://fletcher.tufts.edu/praxis/~/media/fletcher/microsites/praxis/xxvii/2condonchinaafrica.pdf  
,p.g 6 
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experiences, giving African states the opportunity to follow a developmental path which 
considers their domestic realities.  
Chinese exploitation: Is China’s use of the policy of non-interference primary undermining 
Western efforts to increase transparency and good governance. And is the policy used as an 
excuse to do “business” with authoritarian states that violates human rights and use funds to 
prop up their power.  
Peaceful development: The Chinese policy of peaceful development stems from a strategic 
choice by the government to commit to upholding world peace and promoting prosperity to 
all countries.3 The core idea was to characterise China as a responsible world leader that 
emphasises soft power and avoids unnecessary conflicts. 
Independent Variable 
China-Africa Policy of non-interference in the 21 Century 
Dependent Variable 
The essay has two dependent variables being the possible Chinese exploitative agenda and/or 
the opportunity for growth and development. 
Operationalization  
The dependent variables, being the possible Chinese exploitative agenda and/or the 
opportunity for growth and development, can be measured, firstly by observing whether the 
policy has propped up authoritarian regimes and supports political oppression and violence, 
therefore possibly undermining the long term prospects of its partner nation. The research 
focuses on the reality of African Chinese political relations in this regard. The Sudanese 
Chinese relationship, like that of the rest of Africa, has been described by Western 
commentators as being one which is exploitative, and works solely to advantage Chinese 
businesses. There have been many who have argued that the Chinese policy of non-
interference is essentially a justification for supporting authoritarian regimes or corrupt 
regimes. Daniel Large explains this argument when he shares that the Chinese policy of non-
interference, as seen in Sudan, has allowed business to continue with no regard to human 
right violation or injustices in the partner nation. What is emphasised within this debate is 
that ultimately Chinese support could possible offer African politicians and leaders increasing 
space for preserving their own power rather than encouraging broader development. 
The research secondly measures the dependent variable by looking at whether China’s policy 
of non-interference gives African states a unique opportunity to experience independent and 
home-grown political and economic experiences, giving African states the opportunity to 
follow a developmental path which considers their domestic realities. The paper investigates 
China’s rapidly increasing interaction in Africa, in the 21 century, and the effect on the 
                                                          
3 “Backgrounder: Peaceful Development is China's Strategic Choice”,  
http://english.cntv.cn/program/newshour/20110906/108368.shtml, 9 June 2011   
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development path of African countries. Economic growth from Chinese investment in Africa 
is, to a large extent, an undisputed factor but the suitable political model underlying the 
economy remains contested. Western states economies have always been closely connected a 
capitalist democratic state system and the rule of law, and have therefore promoted these 
ideals for growth and expected states in which they interact with to operate in accordance 
with these standards. Chinese engagement in Africa has called into question the Western 
model of state interaction and state growth. China is a socialist single-party states that uses, 
what many academics call, a states-capitalist system, sometimes called capitalism with 
Chinese characteristic. China is also the biggest economy in the world, in terms of purchasing 
power parity, and the fastest growing major economy. This reality has put Africa-China 
relations at the forefront of many discussions relating African governance, looking at the 
outcome of China’s policy of non-interference within African states. Western states 
investment in various African countries has in the past had conditionality’s such as political 
reform with very few successes, therefore making the Chinese form of engagement which 
allows for a developmental path dictated by the domestic reality of the state, as happened in 
China, to become far more attractive than external neo-liberal and western dictated policies.  
There is a strong argument that although Chinese policy on non-interference has drawn 
strong criticism from the Western nations and commentators with regards to lack of 
transparency and issues relating to human rights, they is still evidence that the policy has 
manifested many tangible economic and political benefits for both China and its African 
partners.  
The last measurement that will be investigated is whether bilateral agreements between China 
and African governments create meaningful development. Former president of the People’s 
Republic of China, Hu Jintao, increased his visits to Africa since 2005 signing so called 
“win-win” deals.4 These deals were agreements that China would be able to acquire access to 
raw material of the agreed party and in return China would invest in economic assistance, this 
assistance would predominately come in the form of large-scale infrastructure projects. 
China’s export mainly inexpensive labour intensive consumer goods and high technology 
products and African countries export exclusively raw material and mineral fuels. Most of 
Chinese trade in sub-Saharan Africa has only been conducted in four countries, being 
Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and Angola, all countries who possess China’s desired natural 
resources, iron ore from South Africa, and, of course, oil from Sudan and Angola. The 
dramatic growth of Chinese foreign direct investment in Africa has been imbedded almost 
exclusively in two critical sectors, being resources extraction and infrastructure development. 
Chinese bilateral trade has increased from 11 billion dollars in 2000 to over 210 billion 
dollars in 2013, showing the dramatic increase in investment within the 21 century.5 One of 
the core needs for African development has been infrastructure development, to unlock its 
potential thus increasing trade in Africa. China’s investment in African infrastructure, which 
                                                          
4 “A Decade Of China In Africa: Win-win or Exploitation?” www.vibeghana.com, 25 July 2014 
5 Ibid 
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stood at 13 billion dollars, has shown the potential to fill the void for African infrastructural 
development, investing far more than the World Banks 4 billion dollars. 6 
Chinese FDI can be characterised by two fundamental characteristics. The first of these is 
Chinese state owned enterprises, investing in African states. The second is that Chinese firms 
in Africa tend to utilise their own low-cost labour, rather than investing in the training of 
African workers. The question then rises to whether Chinese investors, who do not hire 
African workers, can be said to really benefit the African countries in which they invest. 
Although this reality is beginning to change, with Chinese investors becoming more aware of 
cultural sensitivities and the needs of the country they investing in to improve social 
conditions, there is still a debate of how effective the influx of FDI in African countries is and 
if it does outweigh employment gains in the host countries.  
The reality is that China has an incredibly large population that is in need of various 
resources to sustain itself. The Chinese population is in need of basic foods, energy, and 
industrial commodities such as grain, meat, oil coal, and steel. With foreign currency reserves 
of well over $1 trillion and an economic growth of just over 7% growth, this creates a 
situation in which China are firstly in great need of natural resources to maintain this growth 
and have the capability of spending massive sums of money in obtaining those resources. On 
one side there is an argument that China is using this dominance and wealth to aggressively 
ingratiate itself with some of Africa’s most tyrannical politicians to secure exclusive access to 
it natural resources and is thus undermining years of effort towards democratic progress and 
good governance within the region. The other argument in support of China argues that the 
principle of entering into trade and investment relationship with no string attached is a 
fundamental tenet of Chinese foreign policy. This has to a large extent been the way in which 
Chinese foreign policy has dealt with interaction with states, always seeking to avoid 
unnecessary intervention in the affairs of other states from as far back as the 1960s. The non-
interference policy is also based on China own states experience of being able to develop 
according to its national context, without imposed external political and economic conditions. 
Understanding which aspect best describes the relationship of Africa China relation is of 
great important for the aim of the research and for a deeper understanding complexities of 
this relationship. The Chinese describe the Sino-African relationship as falling within the 
framework of developing country cooperation and thus argue that it would be hypocritical for 
it to treat developing countries different to how it was treated. This method is argued to be 
much more effective than the West imposing its cultural biases upon other countries, 
violating state sovereignty. 
Limitations of analysis  
The research paper recognises the limitations of such a venture. With the vast amount of 
subjects and discourse around African Chinese relations it would be incredibly challenging 
task to examine the relations in its full spectrum. Therefore the research paper focuses mainly 
                                                          
6“A Decade Of China In Africa: Win-win or Exploitation?” www.vibeghana.com, 25 July 2014 
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on the Chinese policy of non-interference intention and outcome in African states, describing 
whether this interaction is one which is exploitative or a partnership growth.  
Overview of Literature 
There has been much literature written on the subject of African-Chinese relations, including 
a lot of literature on the impact and outcomes of economic and political relations, all which 
cannot in totality be explored here. Therefore I will focus on literature that focuses on the 
Chinese policies of non-interference and the Eurocentric nature of Western African 
engagement. Most of the literature covered on Africa Chinese relations that the research 
paper discusses comes from authors such as Steve Hess, Madison Condon, Large, Alula A. 
Iyasu and others. Many of these authors have focused on the political and economic relations 
with China and Africa, speaking in a positive of negative light and giving a detailed 
explanation of the historical and current reality of the engagement. Most of the literature has 
explored African states interaction with Chinese capital, focusing on the outcome of oil 
diplomacy and its effects on governance in Africa. Authors have researched the outcome of 
resource diplomacy with patronage politics present in many resources rich countries. 
The essay not only looks at the effects and meaning of African Chinese relations from the 
perspective of the policy of non-interference but gives a strong emphasis on the relations and 
outcome of Western African relations. These relations are discussed through the 
interpretations of Authors such as Fanon, Edward Said, Gong and many others. Theses 
Authors explain Africa’s historical relationship with the West, helping show the reasons of 
current relations between African states and Western powers. The Literature shows the 
exploitative nature of Western-African realities and how that rhetoric and behaviour 
continues to exist in different ways. This understanding thus leads us to understand the 
necessity of the alternative that is presented in the policy of non-interference, which the 
research paper discusses through the various authors and sources.  
The research paper briefly explains African Chinese relations by discussing its relations with 
Sudan. Sudan is a defining case in China’s changing relations with Africa and has been and 
continues to be the defining case in China’s changing relations with Africa, being a key 
illustration of transition and convergence in China’s international politics. Sudan has been 
seen to be the geopolitical territory where Beijing faces the challenges of accommodating its 
established and ideological policy with the complexity of African politics. Sino-Sudanese, 
like Sino-African relations have attracted much criticism, specifically from the media, 
governmental, and parties highlighting China’s complicity in numerous human rights 
violations and environmental exploitations. The research paper uses literature to highlight 
these points as well. 
Theoretical approach 
The Research paper finds that within the majority of the literature on China’s presence in 
Africa, there is an argument that there are both opportunities and threats to Africa Chinese 
relations. And that an in-depth analysis finds that China’s engagement with Africa is based 
on strategic political and economic considerations and fits, to a larger extent, within the 
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realist explanatory framework, but that there is also great opportunity for African states to 
direct their future in their own unique manner because of the alternative China provides. 
The paper uses to one theoretical approach for its understanding of states relations within the 
international political economy and the overall relationship between Africa and China, this 
approach being the neo-Gramscian theory. The theory is influenced by the writing of Antonio 
Gramsci understanding of how the state and social forces makeup dominate ideological 
perspectives and is able to perpetuate the existence of a global order. The theory emerged 
from the writing of Robert Cox in the early 1980s, in which he wrote two seminal articles 
which were within the historical materialistic problematic of social transformation.7 Cox 
specifically focused on the construction of hegemony and the manner in which social forces 
that occupy leading roles within the state established hegemony and the how this is then 
transcended to a global arena. 8 The research paper uses Cox’s interpretations of hegemony, 
being an expression of broadly-based consent, which results in the acceptance of ideas and is 
further supported by institutions and material resources.9 This interpretation thus broadens the 
way in which hegemony is defined, no longer being only about economic and military 
capabilities.10 
Cox’s approach within the context of this essay is crucial to the understanding of the role of 
neo-liberal international organisations and globalization, helping explain the reasons behind 
social relations of production, inter-related with state forms and global orders, underpinning 
the global neo-liberal hegemony. This understanding of the international political economy is 
vital to comprehend the importance of the potential partnership in growth that is and can be 
experienced within Africa-China context and the many opportunities that exists within this 
type of partnership. Robert Cox goes on to argue that globalization; the emergence of 
international institution and a border neo-liberal community has manifested an international 
community with the “internationalization” of production and state.11 The process of 
internationalization results in international conformity, thus the restructuring of the role of the 
state and implementing neo-liberal policies.  
Case Selection 
The research focuses on one case study, being Sudan. The reason behind the focus on this 
case study stems from it being one of the biggest trade partners with China and their 
continuously engaged in political interactions with China. China’s relationship with Sudan is 
based on the need for the abundance of oil. Sudan is also one of the biggest traders with 
China therefore bring about a reality whereby there has been much research and attention put 
on the political relationship and the consequences of this relationship, many arguing that 
                                                          
7 Bieler, A & Morton, A: “Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy”, 
International Gramsci Society Online Article. January 2003. Available at:  
http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/online_articles/articles/bieler_morton.shtml 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
10 Cox, R. 2005. Global Perestroika” In Roden Wilkinson (ed) The Global Governance Reader, London/New York: Routledge, 43 
11 Bieler, A & Morton, A: “Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of neo-Gramscian Perspectives in International Political Economy”, 
International Gramsci Society Online Article. January 2003. Available at:  
http://www.internationalgramscisociety.org/resources/online_articles/articles/bieler_morton.shtml 
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China supports authoritarian governments in the country thus damaging years of attempts by 
the West to transform and pressure the Sudan and many other African countries to becoming 
more democratic. Sudan, as stated, is a defining case in China’s changing relations with 
Africa and has been and continues to be the defining case in China’s changing relations with 
Africa, being a key illustration of transition and convergence in China’s international politics.  
Sudan is also a geopolitical territory in which where Beijing faces the challenges of 
accommodating its policy of non-interference with the complexity of African politics. 
An overview of the diplomatic and political relations between the African states and China 
suggest the potential for a reality of mutual development. But these relationships are also 
viewed with great suspicion arguing that China’s engagement with Sudan is likely to bring 
about a reality of perpetual dependence, stemming from the fact of China engaging with 
states that have drastically smaller economies. The case has also been chosen stemming from 
the ability to monitor the effects of Chinese policy of non-interference. In states such as 
Sudan whereby the government of the country are argued to be corrupt and authoritarian, 
they argue that the Chinese policy of non-interference compounds the problem in these 
countries.  
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Chapter 1: Historical origins of China’s policy of non-inference 
The initial phase of Chinese formal interaction with Africa began at the Bandung Conference 
of Non-Aligned Nations in 1955. 12 The improving Chinese-African relations begun at the 
beginning of the 1950s, stemming from China’s worsening ties with the then Soviet Union. 
This then sparked a reality in which China began looking for allies in Africa to establish a 
counter hegemonic collective against both the Soviet Union hegemony and Western 
imperialism. 13 China also saw African states as being its natural allies because of their shared 
history of colonialism. The relationship developed further in the 1960s and 70s with China 
supporting many independence struggles and funding several construction projects. This was 
also a period in which China was able to promote bilateral relations with many African 
countries and provide aid to 30 African countries.14  
The strength of this relationship began to decline in the 1980s when China began to focus on 
its internal economic development, a period in which, many argue, saw China’s gradual 
departure from socialist economic development to a much more capitalist economy.15 The 
change in policy led to China having to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) from Western 
states. Any attempts to strengthen China’s relations with Western countries was short lived 
stemming from the economic sanctions and political isolations that were imposed because of 
the violence that occurred at the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989.16 The resulting reality 
was one in which China was isolated and sanctioned and gave rise to a belief that it would be 
counter-productive to just trade and rely on Western nations for FDI as core tenant to China’s 
developmental plan. This isolation and new understanding of the Chinese developmental plan 
pushed China to widen its relations in the developing world and specifically Africa. 
The 1990s saw a dramatic re-engagement with African states and an unprecedented 
involvement in the continent. The engagement came in the form of trade, investment, 
development assistance, training and technology transfer. 17 This new engagement was 
essentially based on a partnership in growth and many African leaders considered a closer 
economic and political relationship with China as in interaction that would bring future 
prosperity within a short period. This reality was fundamentally different from the Western 
colonialist’s agenda that sort to take up the administrative governance and resources of all the 
countries that they colonised.  
The Chinese experience and the independent manner in which Chinese created a successful 
development model that took its domestic realities in considerations appealed strongly to 
African states and continues to be an attractive model. The Chinese were able to bring 
hundreds of millions of people out of poverty, reducing the number of people living in 
poverty from 84% to 15.9% from the period of 1981 to 2005. 18 And this dramatic 
                                                          
12 Konings, P. China and Africa: Building a Strategic Partnership. Journal of Developing Societies, Volume 23. 3 March 2007. 343 
13 Ayodele, T & Sotola, O: China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment, IPPA Working Paper Series, 2014. Available at: 
www.ippanigeria.org/china_africa_working.pdf, 3-4 
14 Ibd, 4 
15 Ibd, 4 
16 Ibd, 4 
17 Ibd, 4 
18 Ayodele, T & Sotola, O: China in Africa: An Evaluation of Chinese Investment, IPPA Working Paper Series, 2014. Available at: 
www.ippanigeria.org/china_africa_working.pdf, 4 
11 | P a g e  
 
development led many African states to become attractive to the type of development model 
used in China that primary take into consideration the domestic reality of both the political 
and economic make up. China is also seen as been an attractive partner because it provides an 
alternative to institutions such as the World Band and the International Monetary Fund. The 
drive for more Chinese interaction by my African states also stems from the desire to depend 
less on Western foreign investment and development assistance.  
The continuation of the Chinese policy of non-interference has been the core principles in 
which China has continued to interact with Africa. The policy is derived from the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality 
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.19 The policy was essentially designed to reflect 
the solidarity among the Non-Aligned Nations and newly independent post-colonial states in 
Africa. The emphasis on territorial sovereignty understood from strict traditional Westphalian 
terms was in appreciation and understanding of the independence that African states desired 
thus made the interactions far more equal and respectful than previous and current 
interactions with Western counterparts.  
The Chinese policy in the main applies to military interventions and regime change but the 
principles have in reality been expanded in the spheres of Chinese investment and economic 
interactions. The policy presented and continues to present an alternative to; in particular, the 
US led neo-liberal economic ideals and Westerns political ideals which promote a Western 
standard of civilisation. This US led global political economy manifested a reality in which 
many African states were unable to independently manage their own political and economic 
affairs. The reality in which Africans are no longer treated as perpetual 16 year old who 
continually need guidance was a fundamental reason for why African countries embraced the 
type of interactions presented by Chinese engagement, and this will be discussed throughout 
the essay in depth. 
Chapter 2: Understanding African-Western relations  
The Chinese policy of non-interference is a departure from the conditionality’s imposed by 
Western engagement and the standard of civilization in which the West expected all states 
within the International community to abide by. The establishment of Bretton Wood 
institutions, structural adjustment policies, and the promotion of what was termed the 
Washington Consensus, and then Western ideas of good governance all make up what I 
describe as an international standard which has continually been use to pressure the 
developing world and Africa, in particular, to imitate Western ideals and thus advantage the 
West. The imposition of these policies have in the main been detrimental to African states 
and have, to a large extent, been ineffective to African political, social and economic realities. 
In order to understanding whether Chinese engagement is exploitative to African states or is a 
unique positive opportunity. It is important to analyse Africa’s current and historical 
interactions with the West and what those interactions has meant for Africa development. 
                                                          
19 Iyasu, A: China’s Non-Interference Policy and Growing African Concerns, African Arguments Editor, 18 July 2013. Available at: 
http://africanarguments.org/2013/07/18/china%E2%80%99s-non-interference-policy-and-growing-african-concerns/  
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Therefore the essay explains and discusses Africa’s relationship with the West and shows 
how historical and current interactions have been one of control, violation of sovereignty and 
exploitation.  
The Bretton Woods Era 
The aftermath of the Second World War brought about a reality whereby the United States 
found itself the indisputably dominate state in the world. This position afforded them the 
ability to form an institutional framework of the post-war world economy manifested the 
Bretton Woods Systems.20 The ideals of the configuration of this new system were based on 
the thinking of Harry Dexter White and John Maynard Keynes. 21The purpose of the Bretton 
Woods Conference was to formulate unifying principles that would be embedded in the 
institutions that comprise the Bretton Woods System. These institutions would be the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and what would become the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
The principles that would guide these institutions would firstly be a commitment to trade 
liberalisation through multilateral negotiations and the principle of non-discrimination, 
secondly they agreed that the current account transactions would be freed from controls were 
permissible, and lastly there was an agreement that exchange rates would be fixed or pegged. 
22The Bretton Wood Agreement was signed by 44 countries in July 1944 and was 
subsequently entered into force in 1946. 23 The primary focus on the International Monetary 
Fund was to regulate currency exchange rates to facilitate orderly international trade and to 
also assist in loaning money to member states as a last resort when the state is unable borrow 
money from other sources or the state is experiencing balance of payment difficulties. The 
purpose of the World Bank was to give loans to Western European governments, helping 
them rebuild their countries after war and in later years the World Bank moved towards 
development loans in developing countries. 24 
The Bretton Woods system dissolved between the 1968 and 1973.25 This essentially signalled 
the end of an economic system that had been based on the right and obligation of government 
to regulate capital flow and a period characterised by rapid economic growth. In August 1971 
when then President Richard Nixon announced that his administration would suspend the 
dollars convertibility into gold.26 This thus meant that the administration would unilaterally 
be abandoning the Bretton Wood System and saw the lifting of restrictions on capital flows. 
This new era has been marked by dramatically increased financial speculation and low 
growth. From 1975 onwards the IMF began to respond to the balance of payments difficulties 
confronting most of the developing world suffering from poor social and economic growth by 
providing concessional financing through what was known as the Trust Fund. This was 
followed by the creation of new concessional loan program, started in March 1986, called the 
                                                          
20 Cornia, A, R. Jolly & F. Stewart.1987. Adjustment with a Human Face. London, Oxford University Press.10 
21 Ibid, 10 
22 Paul, Johnson. 1993. Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon, New York Times,  
23 Cornia, G. A., R. Jolly and F. Stewart (eds.). 1987, Adjustment With a Human Face. London, Oxford, University Press.12 
24ibid 
25 Paul, Johnson. 1993. Colonialism's Back -- and Not a Moment Too Soon, New York Times, 22 
26 Ibid 
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structural adjustment Facility. The structural adjustment facility was then succeeded by the 
enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in December 1987.27 
Structural Adjustment Policies 
From the early 1980s the Structural Adjustment Policies were introduced to developing 
nations. The core aspects of the policies were based on an all embracing framework for 
reform to overcome the developing states historical problems of development.28 Rather than 
helping solve the problem these policies essentially became major factors in the dynamics of 
crises and decline experienced in most of the developing states and even reinforced existing 
difficulties and introduced new ones as well. The adjustment process plays a dual role in 
which the International Financial Institutions enforces principals of a neo-liberal agenda in 
markets and economic institutions and also pressured developing states to structure and align 
their national governments within the limits established by the Washington Consensus. These 
international financial institutions became an important space in which to entrench an 
international hegemonic structure, which was led by the global dominate economic and 
political power of the United States. This gave power to a US-Western led partnership to 
become involved in the policy making and agenda of sovereign states, thus creating new 
forms of subordination and control.  
Many critics have argued that SAP’s have imposed harsh economic measures which have 
resulted in a deepening of poverty, an undermined food security and self-reliance which has 
manifests a reality which led to unsustainable resources exploitation, environmental 
destruction, and population dislocation and displacement.29 Many have also argued that 
SAP’s have increased the gap between the poor and rich domestically and in global terms. 
The SAP involved loans with the condition that the state would adhere to institutional reform 
policies as outlined by the lender and focused on long term growth. The three areas the loans 
were supposedly targeting was good governance, government intervention in the markets, 
government spending and excessive state ownership. 30 
SAP’s focused on developing states adopting such conditionality’s as austerities, monetary 
devaluation, liberalization of trade, banning restrictions on imports and exports, opening up 
the national stock markets, controlling and monitoring government budgets, increasing 
foreign direct investment, elimination of state subsidies, private investment, and improving 
the rights of overseas investors through national laws.31 The essay argues that this was 
tantamount to handing state sovereignty over to previous colonising power and allowing them 
to structure and restructure states policies and create an economic environment most 
beneficial to their interests.  
The World Bank and the IMF pressured developing states to enforce massive cuts in the 
education budget and spending cuts that reached up to 50% for some universities, and cuts in 
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enrolment.32 A writer for the New York Times Magazine, Paul Johnson, described such 
external initiatives in his article called “Colonialism’s back and not a Moment Too Soon.”33 
The writer makes three main points; the first being that developing states are economically 
bankrupt, the second being that these states have found that they cannot govern themselves 
and lastly that they are asking the colonial powers to return to effectively run their states.34 
As extreme as theses asserts are, they do in many ways reflect the position in which 
international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as they have extended their 
hegemony over Africa and other developing states.35 Many Pan Africanist authors have 
argued that the central tenet to which this re-colonisation process is carried out has been 
through the loan system of SAP’s. Many of the state which has received SAPs saw their 
economies becoming entrenched in far worse economic positions and being more indebt than 
they were prior to taking their loans. Conditions such as massive currency devaluation 
diminished purchasing power of African states and increased the cost of imported products 
have manifested in many of these states.36 
The World Bank and the IMF pressured developing states to enforce massive cuts in the 
education budget and spending cuts that reached up to 50% for some universities, and cuts in 
enrolment.37 A writer for the New York Times Magazine, Paul Johnson, described such 
external initiatives in his article called “Colonialism’s back and not a Moment Too Soon.”38 
The writer makes three main points; the first being that developing states are economically 
bankrupt, the second being that these states have found that they cannot govern themselves 
and lastly that they are asking the colonial powers to return to effectively run their states.39 
As extreme as theses asserts are, they do in many ways reflect the position in which 
international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, as they have extended their 
hegemony over Africa and other developing states.40 Many Pan Africanist authors have 
argued that the central tenet to which this re-colonisation process is carried out has been 
through the loan system of SAP’s. Many of the state which has received SAPs saw their 
economies becoming entrenched in far worse economic positions and being more indebt than 
there were prior to taking their loans. Conditions such as massive currency devaluation 
diminished purchasing power of African states and increased the cost of imported products 
have manifested in many of these states.41 
Countries such as Somalia, Liberia, Mozambique, Congo and Burundi have all experienced 
the consequences of such targeted programs.42 The conditions entrench these states is a US 
led neo-liberal Eurocentric global economic reality that only serves to benefit western states 
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and showed the United Nations and its organisations as being active proponents of the re-
colonisation of African states. The conditions set by western led institutions has been a way 
in which to induce the countries of the global South to impose economic models imported 
from elsewhere that do not serve the interests of the majority of the people in their own state. 
The IMF, World Bank and WTO agreements are merely formalise what has been reality for 
centuries, a Eurocentric standard of civilisation. The Laws of many developing nations have 
been superseded by the superior laws of the market, which also now have prior claim to their 
resources over and above the needs of the very citizens of the country whose existence 
depends upon access to those resources.43 
The outcome has been that the IMF and World Bank serve the powerful interests of the US 
and its partners. Both the World Bank and the IMF voting power of a given state is not 
measured in term of the size of the member states population but how much capital the 
specific member states contributes to the institutions and by how much power the state wields 
in the global community. Groups such as the G7 play a dominate role in determining the 
policy of the institutions. Members such as the US, Japan, Germany and Great Britain each 
having their own director on the institutions executive board and only 19 directors are elected 
by the rest of the approximately 150 member countries.  The institutions are also structured in 
such a manner in which the president of the World band is traditionally a US citizen and is 
also chosen with US congressional involvement. The IMF managing director is also chosen 
traditionally from European states.  
On the IMF board of governors the United States has an estimated 17% of the voting power, 
and the G7 have a combined total of approximately 46% voting power. As a result of the US 
being the biggest contributor and possessing a significant proportion of voting power, there 
are given a dominate voice and essentially at all times exercised an effective veto. The 
outcome has been a reality in which the developing nations that have relatively little power 
within the institution, become subject to programs and policies that are financed by the 
institution and have substantial impact throughout the local economies and societies but the 
actual state been impacted has little control of those measures implemented.44 
A significant aspect which shows the use of US hegemony has been that development 
projects that are undertaken with World Bank financing have been argued to be 
predominately dominated by money included to pay for materials and consulting services 
provided by Western countries. The US Treasury Department officials have calculated that 
for ever US dollar the United States contributes to international development Banks the US 
exporters gain more than two US dollars in bank financed procurement contracts. The reality 
thus becomes that the banks tend to finance bigger and more expensive projects that need 
more material and technical expertise of Western contractors and therefore ignores smaller 
scale and locally appropriate alternatives.  
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From SAP’s to Good Governance 
The process of questioning policies that were termed the Washington Consensus, which 
dictated most of the solutions proposed by the discussed international financial organisations, 
was well away in the 21 century. The term Washington consensus was coined in the work of 
John Williamson in 1989. The ideals essentially emphasis ten recommendations 1) fiscal 
discipline; 2) redirecting public expenditure; 3) tax reform; 4) financial liberalization; 5) 
adoption of a single, competitive exchange rate; 6) trade liberalization; 7) elimination of 
barriers to foreign direct investment; 8) privatization of state owned enterprises; 9) 
deregulation of market entry and competition; and 10) secure property rights.45 These 
recommendations were premised on the ideas shared at the time by political and economic 
circles in Washington, which included the US Congress and Administration. The same ideals 
were adopted by Washington based international institutions such as the IMF and World 
Bank.46 
The failure of the Structural Adjustment Policies were recognised by the World Bank and 
IMF but, from their perspective, the outcome of this failure was not based on poor economic 
policies but rather poor governance as the main reason why developing nations where not 
seeing sufficient or any development. This then led to the institutions adjusting the terms of 
their aid on the provision that the developing states would adopt “good governance”47. The 
notion of good governance, from a Western perception, entails a neo-liberal notion of 
political modernity. This would show that this is another way in which the West has put 
pressure and manipulated states into adopting political institutions which conduct themselves 
in what can be regarded as a similar fashion to the political institution in the West, 
specifically the US, who follow western framework of political institutions. 
The move to discourse on good governance has been premised on the need to get 
governments, specifically African governments, to adopt more democratic and neo-liberal 
policies.48 Good governance can be explained as being an indeterminate term used in 
international development literature to communicate ideas of how public institutions conduct 
public affairs and manage public resources.49 Governance is essentially the process of 
decision making and the process by which decisions are implemented. The discussion on 
good governance has predominately centred around a comparison on the ineffectiveness of 
economies or political bodies with viable economies and political bodies. Good governance 
principles argue that it is the responsibility of the government in power to meet the needs of 
the entire population rather than a portion of it. The 21st century has seen the liberal 
democratic states of the US and West as being used to set the standards to compare to other 
states intuitions when discussing governance. Good governance is a term that has been 
adopted by various international development and financial intuitions but the exact definition 
of what it means has differed. Many authors have argued that there is a conceptual clarity 
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when it comes to good governance and thus can become problematic for the practical 
outcomes that development institutions.50 
The work on the World Bank and the IMF has in general discourse on good governance has 
focused on addressing economic institutions and public sector management, including 
transparency and accountability, regulatory reform, and public sector skills and leadership. 
There have been many issues that have emphasised by various forms of governance 
programmes of donors, which include election monitoring, political party support, combating 
corruption, improved public sector reform, government responsiveness etc.51 Many of the 
donors explicitly emphasis the adopting of neo-liberal policies for the purpose of creating 
stability of the regulatory environment for private sector activities, which would include price 
systems, exchange regimes, and banking systems.  
The replacing of the structural adjustment programs with a more policy lending approach of 
the World Bank has brought an emphasis on governance reform playing a significant role. 
52The Band has stressed the important of improvements in public governance. What has 
hardly changed is that governance requirements demanded by developed states continue to be 
overly intrusive.53 The continue to include inherently domestic issues such as legal 
framework building, corporate governance, tax reforms, public procurement procedures and 
anti-corruption initiatives, and have not included, to any significant extent, pro-poor 
policies.54 The reality has been that the pressure the US and Western donors has put on 
developing states and specifically Africa is tantamount to external intervention into domestic 
institutions has implications for the internal democratic process. This outcome was seen with 
the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs), which was the key framework promoted by 
the World Bank to address criticisms if the SAP’s. Just as the SAP’s the PRSPs were 
criticised for being externally imposed process rather than a development plan which 
reflected an internal policy process rather than a domestically organised development plan 
which would legitimately reflect internal policy processes and political priorities of the 
developing state. 55 
The essay argues that the structural adjustment programs and the focus post-SAP’s on good 
governance are essentially Eurocentric perspectives of the manner in which developing states 
and especially African states should conduct themselves and their realities. The policies have 
continuously intruded on developing states sovereignty and independence. The essay that 
these policies and programs are essentially a continuation of the level of dominations and 
control that have been seen in the centuries before, although taking a much different form and 
using different rhetoric. The governance which the US led neo-liberal policies pressure states 
to adapt their entire realities to imitate US-Western political and economic institution. The 
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essay essentially argues that the US led neo-liberal agenda of the 21st century appears in 
many ways to be an evolution of the hegemonic and Eurocentric realities seen in past 
centuries. To better understand the reasons for why the current hegemonic reality has taken 
its form it’s necessary to trace the ideals and ideas of Eurocentricism and its connection to US 
neo-liberal ideals.  
The origins of Eurocentrism 
Eurocentrism is generally rooted in Europe’s colonial perception of the world being open to 
conquest, control and domination.56 The ideal argued that the people of the third world where 
savage and weak and thus were in need of being civilised, even going as far as to deny the 
existence of non-European cultures57. Examples of this Eurocentric perspective can be found 
in the regional names of the world which are viewed from a Eurocentric worldview and are, 
to a large extent, named in honour of European travellers58. This can be seen in the naming of 
the Middle East, which is a description of an area that slightly east of Europe, the Far East, 
sometimes called the Orient, which is east of Europe. This understanding of reality resulted in 
the Eurocentric self-sustaining core belief that Europe, therefore the European people, are 
central and the most important in regards to all significant aspects of the world’s social 
values, and cultural heritage. The Eurocentric perspective is argued to have used ancient 
Greek history as an important part of fostering Eurocentric agendas and the past and present, 
and as a result Greek history has been fundamentally shaped by the perspective of 
Eurocentrism59. The Eurocentric perspective has always treated Greek history as being part of 
European or Western history and is not acknowledged to be part of the continuous history of 
the Mediterranean over the decades and centuries. The actual history of ancient Greece was 
that it was part of a chain of historical evolution that starts Near East, passes Greece, then 
Rome, before moving to the Middle Ages and then the modern Western world60.  
This shows that Greece, being part of the Mediterranean, was not as historical significant as 
argued by Eurocentric’s but was rather a temporary setting for the historical chain of 
evolution. What Eurocentrism attempts to do is ignore the existence of a history prior to 
Ancient Greece therefore not accepting ancient Greek history as part of the continuous 
history of the geographical area61. The argument basically says that once the touch had been 
handed over to the next bearer, Western civilization, the history of the area become 
irrelevant. The history of mathematics, science and technology has generally been argued, by 
the West, to have begun in Greece, then moving to the Romans, there was then a regression 
to the Dark Ages, then progression and a continuation with the Renaissance and the Industrial 
Revolution62. There has been very little mention of the contribution made and achievements 
in places such as China, India, Ancient Egypt and various Muslim thinkers in European and 
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American schools. The Eurocentric perspective only really mentions the Americas, 
Australasia and Africa when discussing colonialism, giving no reference to pre-colonial 
civilization, science or culture.  
The Belief in European superiority can be said to have come about in the period of European 
Imperialism, which is argued to have initial begun in the 16th century and increased 
dramatically in the 17th and 18th century, reaching its peak in the 19th century63. Eurocentric 
perspectives have always distorted reality to benefit colonizing power, arguing that the native 
or the “colonial other” as uncivilised and savage. Franz Fanon in his book “The Wretched of 
the Earth” shows how settlers often portrayed natives as the negation of values and as being 
the most perfect embodiment of evil, showing the thinking of settlers like Monsieur Meyer, 
who was a representative of the imperial power in Algeria64. Monsieur Meyer was quoted 
saying, “He (the native) is the deforming element…the depository of maleficent powers, the 
unconscious and irretrievable instrument of blind forces.65” Edward Said support this 
interpretation of colonial reality in his book Culture and Imperialism and writes that 
imperialism and colonialism was not simply about accumulation but was also about the 
ideological support of such ventures, which included the belief that the different people and 
area required domination.66 The Western belief was that “inferior” people where in need of 
guidance from them thus legitimising European authority in the distant lands67.  
One of the core arguments of Eurocentrism, also relating to Western supremacy, has been its 
belief in the superiority of Christianity. This attitude had, to a large extent, related to spread 
of Islam at the beginning of the 14th century in many areas of Europe; this was a threat which 
lasted in the memories of Europeans and was regarded as being the clash of civilisations68. 
The Orient has been argued to have been discussed as a construct of Western culture, 
perceived as a negative yet fascinating area that serves as a mirror image which is used to 
cast a positive image of the West and give the Occident its identity69. What Europe did, as it 
did with many other areas, was construct the East as a cultural “other” and after doing this the 
West would then make the “other” conform to the Western image70. The exploration of the 
other through authors such as Flaubert and Marx is argued by some authors to be a project to 
exploit and remould what Europe saw as rich but overall a savage or shameful Oriental 
sphere71. An example of this can be seen when Sectary to the Board in the 19th century, Lord 
Macaulay, argued that India was both barbarous source of potential riches and was also a 
place in need of civilisation.72 The essay argues that this reality of domination and perception, 
although it has taken a significant different form, continues exist in our current reality 
whereby the US and West has constructed a class of otherness and set about labelling and 
imposing a preferred Western construct of understanding in different areas. 
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Neo-Liberal links to pervious Western ideology 
Eurocentrism and Western supremacy both argued for the uniqueness and importance of the 
Europeans people in civilising the world and bring about civilisation in areas that either did 
not have it, such as Africa, and to develop it in Asian areas. These perspectives offered 
Europe as a model to all societies that had a genetic incapacity that held them back from 
evolving. Neo-Liberalism although different in rhetoric adopted many of the core ideals that 
these perspectives argued. Adapting to the new reality but still giving the West as the ideal 
societies that states all around the world have to adapt to. Before going into an in-depth 
analysis of how neo-liberalism has created a reality whereby the majority of international 
states have to conform to an existing western, specifically American, ideological reality in 
order become an accepted or recognised international player, it is important to lay out the 
main tenants of neo-liberalism. Neo- liberalism can be described as a set of economic policies 
that became prominent from the 1980s and thus became imposed by powerful financial 
institutions such as the World Band, the inter-American Development bank, and the 
International Monetary Fund73. Neo- liberalism goal was to create an environment that 
allowed for international trade and investment, which they argued would manifest a reality by 
which all nations prospered and developed equally and fairly. This was the new standard set 
but the West and there was no alternative to this standard. There are various principles which 
need to be followed in order to accomplish neo-liberal goals. This includes removal of 
barriers to free trade such as Tariffs, restrictions to capital flow, regulations and removal of 
certain standards or laws. 74 
The focus was to create market based economies with no interference for governments, which 
is believed to be beneficial for all involved. The reality appears to show otherwise, many 
question the possibility of “free” trade within an international community which has 
hegemonic states that influence and manipulate realities. Neo-liberal policies for some have 
been extremely beneficial, some states experiences large growth but for the majority the 
policies have had a negative impact. There has been an increase in poverty and the immediate 
needs of many people around the world have not been met. An example of this can be seen 
with statistics showing that almost 3 billion people live on fewer than two dollars a day75. 
There has been a new global standard of civilisation that has been modelled by the West and 
imposed willingly or by pressurising weaker states. This new standard of civilisation has its 
roots, as Gerrit W. Gong explains, in 19th and 20th century Eurocentric perspectives. 76 
One of Gong’s main focuses was attempting to answer the question of how, where and to 
what extent, in regards to the current global system, global standards of civilisation 
established identity boundaries for those included within and those who can be considered to 
be left outside a self-determined international society77. Gong explains his understanding of 
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the standard of civilisation by saying that it is an expression of the assumption used to 
distinguish those that belong to a particular society and those who do not78. He shows that as 
a result, there is now as global reality whereby those who conform to this standard of 
civilisation are considered insiders and thus “civilised” and progressive. Those who do not 
are seen as outsider’s therefore “uncivilised”. Gong shows that the standard of civilisation 
that the existed in the 19th century international society supposedly provided a legal way to 
demarcate the boundaries of “civilised” and differentiated among what they called civilised 
and savage countries79. There is a connection to this 19th century standard and the 
international expansion of the 20th and subsequently 21st century economic and financial 
system, now defined as the 21st century economic and finical civilisation80. Our current 
economic and financial standards are explained by Gong to demarcate a global hierarchy of 
“non-market”, “emerging market” and “developed market entities.81” Gongs main argument 
is, helping to answering the main question the essay asks, that some standard of civilisation 
will remain a feature of any international society wherein there is cultural diversity and 
pluralism existing with hierarchy and anarchy, regardless of how close the ties between 
international societies become. 82 
The West was different from any empire in the past, because they went about creating a 
specific philosophical, moral and scientific doctrine in their attempt to legitimise their 
international hegemony83. The West also specific perpetuated a message by which it all states 
had to “catch up”, with the only way in which to do that being to follow a Western blueprint. 
Sophie Bessis argues that the Wests developmental ideology argues that developing states 
should mimic Western states, even though she argues that this is not possible because the 
same rules of appropriation and exploitation of land, resources and the freedom to migrate no 
longer exist.84 Bessis argues that the West historically and currently covers up its own 
violations and generally assigns its self as being the sole protector; this is the position that the 
United States usually argues, and the guarantor of Democracy, modernity and human rights.85 
This message and international reality forces international societies to mould themselves into 
the Western, specifically American, image which is argued to be the uncontested model of a 
“civilised” society. This shows that there is a very evident link in the ideology and principles 
of Eurocentrism, Western supremacy and the current neoliberal reality. The ultimate goal of 
America and its Western partners is to reform and “rescue” what they have previously and 
currently identify as the “other,” to make it resemble them through the use of new forms of 
intervention.  
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Rating Agencies 
Just as the IMF and World Bank has helped solidify US hegemony, rating agencies play a 
similar and unique role in promoting hegemonic control. The West, led by the US, has set up 
international trade standards that are compulsory to follow in order to be accepted in the 
international trading community, which as stated before are neoliberal. The rating agencies, 
have played a prominent role in bring about a new financial standard of civilisation, whereby 
their ratings measures represent the new criteria for countries desiring to conform to the new 
or modern standard of, to borrow from the rhetoric of Eurocentrism and Western supremacy, 
“civilised” credit worthiness86. The Banks that fulfil this role are Thomas Bank Watch, Duff 
and Phelps, Fitch IBCA, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s87. The rankings rate from AAA, 
which is the best, to CC, being the worst and these rating agencies, to a large extent, 
determine the amount of Foreign direct investment a country will receive, and the agencies 
will only rate positively those states who have conformed to the US led economic 
principles88. Four of these top five rating agencies are based in the US, New York.  
The Understanding of these realities and what they mean for Western African interaction is 
vital to understanding why Chinese interactions with African states presents a unique 
opportunity for African states to develop a developmental path that takes in consideration its 
domestic realities and can bring about state led sustainable change. 
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Chapter 3: Is Chinese policy of none intervention exploitative of beneficial to African 
states? 
“No country has the right to impose its will on others, nor can it undermine or deny other 
countries’ sovereignty under whatever excuse. Facts have proven that such practices as 
disregarding other’s sovereignty, bullying the small and the weak by dint of one’s size and 
power, and pursuing hegemony and power politics would not get any- where. The affairs of a 
country should be decided by its own people, and the affairs of the world should be handled 
by consultation among all countries on an equal footing.” 
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, at a speech commemorating the 50th Anniversary of The Five 
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence on the 28th of June 2008. 
The Chinese policy of non-interference, in contrast, to Western engagement is of a non-
prescriptive nature and does not impose political, social or economic ideals. It gives space for 
African states to create their own identity, rather than imitating, and although there is many 
problems that have occurred within the context of African Chinese relations, which will be 
discussed later. It does present an opportunity for independent growth with no externally 
imposed economic and political ideals and a possibility to manifest a reality in which African 
states develop a developmental path which can lead to social and economic growth. This has 
been one of the main reasons behind why African states have embraced China as their 
economic partner and a source for economic development. The policy emphasizes the 
importance of the state as a principle actor for economic development, unlike what has been 
argued by the West. Western states vilify the state, arguing that the state should play a 
minimal role and, as discussed, enhance the position of the private sector.  
The policy of non-interference communicated in Indonesia at the Bandung Conference 
essentially to signal an important turning point for South-South cooperation and defined the 
appropriate method of engagement. African states met to collectively agree that the Five 
Principles, already discussed, would shape the agenda of the emerging Non-Aligned 
Movement, and is still seen as the most appropriate way to engage with partners currently by 
most African states. 89 The Bandung Declaration revolutionized relations between Africa and 
China who all adopted the Five Principles that guide their foreign relations. This unity was 
emphasized when then president of Indonesia Sukarno stated, “This is the first inter-
continental conference of the so-called colored people in the history of mankind.”90 The 
understanding was further emphasized by the Egyptian president Nasser, when he added that 
the two prerequisites for world peace was non-interference in other states affairs and “the 
right of all nations to choose their own political and economic systems.”  
This understanding of the policy of non-interference is a core reason to why the research 
paper argues that African engagement with their Chinese counter-part presents an 
opportunities rather than being a form of exploitation. The vison to create partnership which 
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does not pressure any state involved to adopt policies and realities which do not take into 
consideration the domestic make-up and allow states to mature and develop independently. 
The Five Principles adopted by the states of the Non-Aligned Movement continue to reflect 
the desire of African states, especially taking into considerations the impact of Western led 
initiatives and neo-liberalism. The closing speech for the conference captured the unity of the 
developing state to abide by the agreed on principles when Nehru state that: 
We are brothers not only because we are Asians and Africans, but also because we are linked 
by the immeasurable wish for peace, resolute resistance to all dictates, firm determination to 
raise ourselves from backwardness. I am deeply convinced that we have made a great 
achievement here, not only to the benefit of Asia and Africa, but for the whole of mankind as 
well.91 
The Bandung Conference represented a watershed event for initiating and strengthening 
developing states cooperation. And China continues to emphasis the non-interference in 
every interaction with other developing states, showing its dedication to the Five Principles in 
the face of complex emerging realities in the international political economic structures. 92 
Chinese interaction with Africa has manifested through soft power, peaceful development  
and a promise of non-interference, as discussed, and has in the main proven successful in 
gaining the acceptance of African leaders and large sections of the population. 93 This reality 
is further emphasized by a macroeconomists within the World Bank who admits that Chinese 
engagement in non-interference in African states internal affairs and lack of lending 
conditionality’s on governance of fiscal management have, to a large extent, produced 
positive reactions from various governments. 94  
African leader from across the continent have shown their support for non-interference and 
this rhetoric can be best summed up by the former Ethiopian president Mele Zenawi when he 
addressed the forum on China-African Cooperation in Beijing, from the 3-5 of November in 
2006. President Zenawi state that, “China was always at the side of Africans, which created 
mutual trust between us. China also deserves credit for never interfering in the political 
affairs of the continent.”95 
These same leaders are also embracing Chinese engagement because of the way in which 
China has upheld their promises to building railroads, highways, hydroelectric dams, roads 
and many other various infrastructural projects. 96 The timely manner in which infrastructure 
has been constructed and the fact that China does not interfere in the domestic affairs of the 
state has led many leaders to ignore outside criticism in whole and commend Beijing for its 
pragmatic approach towards Africa states. Although there is small pockets of resentment 
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against the Chinese by the citizens of some African states, there is in majority agreement and 
support for Chinese engagement and for the policy of non-interference. 97 
For Africa, China’s Policy of “Non-interference” is: 
 
Source: Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong98 
The table above shows that more people strongly approve or approve of non-interference than 
strongly disapprove or disapprove in each on the countries surveyed, with Sudan showing the 
highest approval percentage. The reason for the high approval in Sudan could possibly be 
because of long period and level of economic participation in the country, and this approval 
exists even though there has been a high Western disapproval of the government’s handling 
of human right violations in Sudan.  
The research paper argues that Chinese relations with Africa has, to a larger extent, presented 
an attractive model for development, aid, investment and infrastructure development without 
the patronising conditionality’s of Western states, thus presenting a new and more 
appropriate way of interacting with African states. The Chinese emphasis on mutual respect 
and win-win relations under the banner of non-interference has made their model of state 
engagement far more attractive than Western engagement and has proven, at least in the short 
term, to have won the favour of a large amount of African statesmen and the support of large 
parts of their populations.  
Sino-Africa Relations Criticisms  
That being said, many authors on Sino-African relations have argued that the policy has been 
applied selectively to suit China’s interest at various times, beginning in its earliest days of 
implementation in the1960s and 1970s when China supported revolutionary movements in 
Africa and Asia. Although China has never explicitly stayed away from their rhetoric of the 
Five Principles, it has frequently acted in a manner which was contradictory to what it had 
communicated. Under the leadership of Mao Zedong the Peoples Republic of China 
supported may revolutionary struggles in the developing world and even involved itself in a 
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Country
Good Policy 
(%)
Basically good, but with 
some problems (%)
More harmful 
thangood (%) Quite harmful(%) Don’tknow (%)
Ethiopia 14.3 50.5 16.3 11.2 7.7
Sudan 43.2 33.6 8.0 4.8 10.4
Kenya 31.1 35.8 16.6 12.4 4.1
Nigeria 17.3 31.0 14.7 12.7 24.4
South Africa 12.2 31.0 19.8 13.2 23.9
Zambia 29.6 36.2 18.9 8.2 7.1
Botswana 22.2 34.3 18.7 9.1 15.7
Egypt 34.3 23.6 19.5 7.2 15.4
Ghana 24.0 32.8 13.6 19.2 10.4
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border intervention into Vietnam in 1979.99 China also found itself in clashes with India, 
Russia and in Korea with the US and the UN. China’s reaction to such criticism during this 
period was that it existed in a global environment which made it isolated and thus had to be 
defensive in a reality in which it believed it was under attack from the United States and, 
from the late 1950s, the Soviet Union.100 China argues that it had to be prepared to defend 
itself, so not to be dragged into a position of humiliating subjugation that is had previously 
experience in a “century of humiliation” after the First Opium War of 1839. 101 This reality is 
thus the reason that China emphasizes when defending its historical record, arguing that when 
issues directly impacted their self-interest it was imperative they fought back.  
China has since become a much more wealthy country and avoided any military conflict 
throughout the past three decades thus debates around the countries willingness to get 
aggressive, while communicating ideas of global peace, has substantially decreased. 
Although this debate has resurfaced to some extent with regards to the South China Sea 
disputes but this is a matter the paper does not focus on. The criticism now predominately 
focuses on China’s investments in countries with internal conflicts and human rights 
problems in Africa. The Chinese policy of non-interference and China’s respect for 
sovereignty has meant that is puts little focus on the internal realities on African states, and 
the possible outcomes that may arise from its investment spending. China has also been 
accused of initiating infrastructures projects that precipitate notorious human right 
violations.102 There have been various instances as seen in Namibia, South African and 
Zambia where it had been found that Chinese managers have repeatedly ignored local 
minimum wage laws and affirmative action requirements. 103 Many international observers 
have also argued that Chinese foreign policy to Africa, and in particular their policy of non-
interference, undermines international efforts to increase transparency and good governance. 
Many have labeled the relations as neo-colonialism and an aid for oil strategy. Writers and 
authors from Africa have argued that Chinese enterprises have underbid local firms, 
especially those within textile industry and that many Chinese ventures do not hire Africans 
and thus do not transfer the necessary skills and capacity which African states desire, both 
arguing that China has to link human rights to business activities.  
Chinese Response to Criticism  
China’s response to this criticism has been to say that Chinese leaders believe that there 
should be a primacy of economic, social and cultural rights over civil and political rights. 104 
China strongly believes that economic, social and cultural rights are achieved through 
economic development and investment and thus disagree with any deviations from an 
economic growth path for civil and political rights. China has also stated, similar to what 
many have argued in the developing world, that they strongly believe in the non-universality 
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of human rights. The Asian value system similar to African values has culturally placed 
family and community before individuality, thus making Western conceptions of human 
rights in man and individualist, inappropriate in such spaces. The West has dictated the 
existence of universal norms and principles that much of the world did not have the 
opportunity be involved in the writing of. This thus questions the legitimacy of any claim to 
universal rights that take into consideration the realities of the developing world.  
China has also always opposed any type of political conditionality based on its conviction of 
independent development growth and has seen such attempts at Western conditionality’s as 
being a way to impose Western values on developing states which erodes their sovereignty 
and weakens their position. Western development minds have continuously criticized China 
for its interaction with states which do not integrate themselves to the standard of civilization 
set by the West, arguing that China should use its economic leverage as a political tool and 
threaten to cut off financial ties to state repeatedly violate human rights. 105 They go onto say 
that aid rewards the behaviour of dictators and play a significant role in funding the 
oppression of reformists. 106Although this argument seems to be valid in some cases, it 
ignores much of the empirical evidence that shows that political conditionality exercised by 
the West in Africa, as explained earlier, failed to actually affect positive change.  
Failure of Western Conditionality 
Oliver Morrissey best explains the outcome of Western conditionality’s when he surveyed 
literature evaluating the effectiveness of conditionality’s to force change on trade policy 
reforms and concluded that:107    
“If countries displayed no initial tendency to implement reforms of the desired type, then 
conditional lending appeared to have little effect in encouraging reform. The only countries 
that appeared to meet conditions were those whose governments favoured the economic 
policies embodied in the adjustment programme; it was government preferences, not aid 
conditions, which determined reform efforts. If interpreted strictly, specified reforms to be 
‘substantially’ implemented within a short time period, conditionality fails.108  
Morrissey shows the flaws in Western discourse on African development and aid 
conditionality and how it has frequently failed. There is further evidence that shows that 
conditionality is unethical, specifically with regards to the possibility that it may cause more 
harm than then good.109 This argument stems from the fact that the people most in need of 
development assistance are frequently those who live under autocratic oppression and 
authoritative leaders, which is not of their own fault. Refusing development assistance and 
aid to these regimes would result in the suffering of communities for the wrong doings of 
their leaders. The other ethical argument which has been emphasised in particular by the 
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Chinese has been that it is a form of interventionism that violates state sovereignty and can be 
used to target states.110 
The main argument, which the research paper will expand on later, has been that interference 
or conditionality creates more harm than good in that it impedes the natural growth process of 
governance.111 What is core to what the research paper is trying to explain is that interference 
or conditionality has deprived African governments of the responsibility of determining their 
own future. It deprives them of choosing the path of political, social and economic 
development or evolution in which they desire. The reality is that political and economic 
competence and accountability stems from learning by doing, and what has historical 
happened is that Western intervention circumvents this mechanism. 112There has been 
growing literature that continue to emphasise the point that the Western development plan is 
demanding too much too soon from the governments, with regards to their progress towards 
human right, transparency and democracy. Western states ignore the developmental path 
which they had historically taken, which had the same problems. The reality is that these 
demands have got in the way of economic growth, which may itself be a precondition for 
good governance. 
The arguments for conditionality is seen as paternal and patronising by the Chinese and the 
question of whether to allow a generation of people from a particular African state to endure 
autocracy for the sake of development is believed to be the question only asked and answered 
by the people and leadership of the African state itself. China has had no problem with 
becoming involved with what many have described as the authoritarian governments of 
Zimbabwe, Angola, and Sudan because of its own experience has been growth first rights 
later. China has and continues to be a prime example of an authoritarian developmental state 
in which the government plays a vital role and actively intervenes in the state to promote its 
transition from a mainly agrarian reality to become an successful industrialised capitalist 
economy. 
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Chapter 4: The Sudanese case study 
Sudan is a defining case in China’s changing relations with Africa and continues, to a large 
extent, to be the defining case in China’s changing relations with Africa, being an important 
illustration of what Chinese interaction with Africa has been about. Sudan has been seen to be 
the geopolitical territory where Chinese leadership faces the challenges of accommodating its 
established and ideological policy of non-interference with the complexity of African politics 
and realities. Sino-Sudanese relations have attracted much criticism, specifically from the 
media, various governments, and parties highlighting China’s complicity in numerous human 
rights violations and environmental exploitations. Before beginning to explaining the 
relationship, its complexities and its meaning to the African continent it is important to 
reiterate and explaining the formation and uniqueness of the relationship.  
Sino-Chinese relations can be traced as far back as 441 AD, whereby contact was first 
established113. Modern relations between the People’s Republic of China and Sudan began in 
1959 and have since continued stable and good relations. 114 Since then there has been 
various military and parliamentary governments in Sudan but relations with China has been a 
constant. The intensification of this relation has been in a large part due to the Sudanese oil 
sector and authors such as Large have argued that the strategic imperatives revolving around 
oil interests has been mainly responsible for Chinese policies on sovereignty and non-
interference. This has been disputed by many arguing and showing that the reality is that the 
Chinese doctrine of non-interference goes back beyond this point and has been constant in all 
developing and developed countries in which it has relations with.   
Chinese interaction with Sudan, from the period since it gained its independence, has been 
consistent with its doctrine of respecting sovereignty and non-interference. Chinese economic 
and technical relations with Sudan began from the early 1960s with the 1962 agreement on 
Economic and Technical Cooperation (ETC), which remains effective to this day.115 The 
1970s also saw the signing of a Cultural, Scientific and Technical Protocol (CSTP) and the 
further cementing of the two states relations116. These agreements and the intensification of 
interaction led to a rise in project based assistance in infrastructure and public building, 
which in turn motivated a flow of professional staff.  
The period between the 1970s to the mid 1990 saw China giving over 100 million US dollars 
in interest free loans for the construction of the two bridges, Friendship Hall, a 410 km 
tarmac road, one textile mill, a hospital and various rice cultivation and fishing projects.117 
This essentially marked the strong ties that would exist between the two states and did well to 
strengthen the relationship.  
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The beginning of the 20th century saw a dramatic inflow of China based foreign direct 
investment into Sudan’s oil sector, approximately 7.6 billion US dollars.118 The 1990s 
manifested a reality in which China became a powerful developing state, as it ascended in 
international political and economic spheres. This industrialisation period saw over 400 
million people in the China being uplifted from poverty and a new vibrant desire for natural 
and fuel resources. 
 
This rapid industrialisation period began the manifestation of what many regarded as a more 
bipolar global reality, with similar connotations to that of the US-Soviet relations. This new 
reality therefore created conditions whereby China would provide an alternative development 
model for less developed states. The relationship between China and Sudan has been seen 
through this lens and is deemed to be a good case to illustrate China’s development model, as 
well as a space to explore Sino-Sudanese relations and Sino-African relations. 119  
 
Sudan has experienced a turbulent reality in both its recent and past history. Racial and 
religious divides in connection to its socially and economically marginalised populace has 
been a catalysed for successive civil wars between the North and South. This reality has also 
led to a horrific genocide and periods of famine and starvation. Sudan’s governance, as stated 
before, fluctuates from periods of parliamentary democracy and military rule, with both 
maintaining an more authoritarian type rule over institutions and citizens, therefore nullifying 
any real prospect of more democratic state building. Sudan has experienced a reality in which 
its leadership has seen war making as a substitute for state building, rather than democratic 
principles.  
 
1989 saw the end of civilian parliamentary rule with a military coup of the then ruling party- 
the national Islamic Front, which is now called the National Congress Party. The National 
Congress Party (NCP) has since then dominated the political landscape through authoritarian 
rule and the use of discourse of militant Islam and Arab supremacy. The NCP regime has 
continuously reacted to any defiance and civilian discontent with state sanctioned violence, 
which have led to protracted armed conflicts.120 Chinese interaction and involvement in the 
Sudanese territory has been criticised because of its unwillingness to interfere in social and 
political realities within Sudan and essentially work with regimes that were committing 
human right violations.  
 
China has become Sudan’s biggest trading partner, with Chinese state owned oil companies 
playing a central role in the development of Sudanese oil industries. The China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the largest shareholder in the two biggest oil consortiums 
in Sudan, being the Petrodar and the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC). 
Chinese companies have also been responsible for building most of Sudan’s oil 
infrastructure; this would include marine terminals, road and rails, and cross-country 
pipelines. Close to 70% of Sudanese imports are from China and China is also Sudan’s 
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largest purchaser of Sudanese oil. 121 This reality further shows how oil is central to debates 
around Sudanese Chinese relations, with well integrated economic interests.  
 
The relationship between the states has involved a mixture of personal relationships between 
leaders, as well as military cooperation with arms supplied, and party communications. Core 
to this relationship has been China’s respect for Sudan’s territorial integrity and state 
sovereignty. Many have argued that China’s relationship with Sudan based on non-
interference has resulted in domestic conflicts and has maintained the power of the Sudanese 
elite.  
 
As stated the dynamics of the relationship between Sudan and China stems from its own 
reality of colonial and development reality, and the belief in the developing states agreements 
made at the Bandung conference. The five principles of co-existence has been core to 
Chinese foreign policy, with the belief that the political affairs of all nations should be the 
exclusive concerns of that state and its government and thus must be respected by all states. 
China’s decision is connected to its history of foreign domination, and its domestic 
experience of separatist movements and territorial disputes within the Chinese territory, 
therefore motivating it to adhere to strict Westphalia norms of state form.  
 
The policies of non-interference have been met with great support from most African states, 
as they themselves believe in the respect of sovereignty and African solutions for African 
problems. China’s belief in unconditional aid has also suited many that are in desperate need 
for such aid by who do not comply with the principles set mainly by Western states or 
Western led international intuitions. Many of the developing states believe that Western or 
external involvement in domestic issues leads to exploitation. These fears are only intensified 
when International institutions such as the United Nations were used for regime change in 
Libya after the African Union and African states recommended a different path.  
 
These concerns for interference in other states political affairs are the reason most African 
states oppose such decisions and why Sudan and China frown upon external interference into 
domestic concerns. China made this point clear in the case of Darfur when the Chinese 
ambassador to Sudan, Deng Shaoqin, state in 2006 that Beijing was “opposed to any 
intervention by the United Nations in the internal affairs of Sudan under the pretext of human 
rights violations”122 Western commentators have argued that China has used this as an excuse 
to support authoritarian regimes and to pursue business as a form of applied politics, arguing 
that interference in states realities is necessary when rights of the population within that state 
are being violated.   
 
This inference ignores the Chinese historical use of its policy of non-interference as well as 
its use in not only Sudan but all states that it has bi lateral political or economic relationships 
with. Central to Chinese engagement in Sudan has been the guarantee of non-interference and 
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independent experiences. The People’s Republic of China have emphasised that their 
relationship with Sudan, from the onset, would be based on respect of state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity. It is true that the intensification of ties was, to a large extent, based on 
China entering the Sudanese oil sector and Chinese efforts to develop an oil export industry 
in Sudan.123 This reality stemmed from The US and Canadian companies abandoning South 
Sudanese oil fields in the 1990s because of hostiles that arose from North American 
consumers and investors about interaction with Sudan, therefore giving China the opportunity 
to fill the vacuum.124 But the relationship has been consistent since the beginning and the 
relationship has also been consistent with China’s overall foreign policy.  
 
The topic of much contestation has been the Chinese policy of non-interference in Sudan and 
the effects it has had on the Chinese image and Sudanese reality. The policy has been the 
defining marker of difference from the West, arguing that it has detrimental effect on the 
reality of Sudanese people and perpetuates conflict. Many have also argued that that policy 
has not been abided by the Chinese in many instances, arguing that sending peacekeepers and 
formerly helping to persuade the Sudanese ruling National Congress Party to accept the 
African Union/ United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID) was in contradiction 
to the policy.125 The argument for those calling on China to revise its non-interference policy 
argue that the need for resources and raw material is the reasons behind the policy and that 
China has been propping up the Sudanese government through investments and access to 
cheap capital worth billions of dollars. The example which is given stems from China 
investing an estimate $30 billion dollars into Sudan, while serving as Sudan’s biggest trading 
partner when much of the world where shocked by the human right violations and massacres 
taking place in Darfur. 126 They look at the period of 1999 to 2005 which was a time which 
includes the beginning of the Darfur crisis. They show that Sudan’s imports of small arms 
increased by 680%, to an estimated $55 million dollars, with China making up 90% of those 
sales.127 The West and some from the developing world have thus argued that China’s 
investment practices under the auspices of the policy of non-interference are exacerbating 
violence, conflict and instability in Africa which as detrimental spill over effect in 
neighbouring states. 
 
On the other hand, many have also argued that African peace, internal relations and security 
is foremost the responsibility of African people, and that solutions to African problems are in 
the minds of African people. China has continuously supported African states in maintaining 
peace and stability by enhancing diplomatic relations and providing spaces for dialogue and 
peaceful resolution to conflicts. Many have also emphasised China’s contribution to United 
Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, contributing both military and civilian personnel. 
China’s recent decision to send peacekeepers in South Sudan with 700 strong contingent due 
to arrive early April 2015, as part of a UN mission to protect civilians in a nation which was 
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devastated by conflict.128 Many have argued that this is in contradiction to China’s policy of 
non-interference but the reality is that they have never transgressed from these principles. 
Their support of peace initiatives is been part of the support of developing states in the 
developing world. China also argues that economic support in states such as Sudan is 
designed to eradicate conflict by addressing the root cause of the conflict, being poverty. 
Professor Hongsheng Sheng, of the Law School of Zhejiang Sci-Tech University, emphasised 
this when he said “Peace should parallel development and the key method to eliminating war 
is to eliminate the causes from which wars arise.”129 
Chapter 5: African-Chinese relations opportunity for growth 
“China adheres to the development path that conforms to its own reality. There is no 
precedence for China’s development. In case of industrialization, we can’t repeat colonialism 
as some developed countries once did at the initial stage of individualization. In early years 
since the founding of PRC, we copied the industrialization model of a few socialist countries 
featured by prioritizing heavy industry but we failed. In the period of “great-leap-forward”, 
we wishfully set the goal of surpassing UK and US in a dozen of years, but that only led to 
the serious catastrophe on our nation and people. The bitter lessons drawn from history told 
us that industrialization can’t be carried out in the way divorced from national conditions 
and reality. Today China’s industrialization has recorded great success. In more than 30 
years the annual average growth rate of industrial added value exceeds 11 percent. Industry 
contributes around 40 percent of GDP and the economic growth. China at present is the 
biggest manufacturer in the world. In the course of industrialization, China constantly 
modifies its path according to the national conditions and development stages, drawing 
experiences and lessons from other countries. We make adjustment from partially prioritizing 
the heavy industry to balancing the development of heavy and light industries. Now we are 
embarking on the road of new type of industrialization.”130 
The global consensus today is that the Washington consensus was a failure and did not 
provide the condition that would lead to economic growth and social development. These 
neo-liberal policies pursued by the international institutes which pressured states to play a 
much more circumscribed role than were embraced by the most of East Asian countries that 
used policies associated with a developmental state.131 The need for a radical re-thinking of a 
strategy for development in Africa is imperative if Africans wish to create sustainable social 
and economic development in the global economy. This re-strategizing is even made more 
important when you take into consideration the extreme poverty that exists in many African 
countries. The economic reality of Africa is that the share of Africa in the global trade 
remained insignificant despite the implementation of the policies that were recommended by 
financial intuitions such as the IMF and World Bank. The failure of these policies highlights 
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the need for a paradigm shift from the US led neo-liberalism in order to achieve more 
sustainable development. 
The essay argues that the policy of non-interference can contribute significantly in bringing 
about an environment that gives Africa states its desired sustainable development. China’s 
perpetual search for autonomy and self-determination has resulted in a multilateral approach 
to global relationships which contrast sharply with increasing unilateralist direction the US 
policies have taken over the last 20 years. 132 The Chinese policy of non-interference is the 
key ideal in which China interacts within the global context and has attempted to have, 
through multinational relationship, a new global order founded on economic relationships 
but, most importantly, an order which recognizes political and cultural difference as well as 
differences in regional and national practices within a common global framework. The 
success of the Chinese economy, their ability to take hundreds of millions of their people out 
of poverty, qualifies the Chinese to provide leadership in the formation of an alternative 
global order. The policy is not necessarily relevant as a direct model but rather as a new lens 
through which to view the world. This alternative world order allows the state to play a much 
more prominent role in the development of their states and dismisses universal blueprints for 
development imposed by external actors. 133 
The Chinese policy in Africa, I argue, is a starting point for identifying a mode of 
development that is independent from US neo-liberalism or the Washington Consensus. The 
Chinese model of state interaction is highly valuable in the sense that the developing world’s 
voice within the global community is enhanced. The policies of non-interference also give 
space to African for the first time in modern history to create economic and political domestic 
reality that are unique to their social and indigenous realities rather than imitating external 
ideal which could not be adapted to internal realities. The Chinese policy of non-interference 
set a desired model in which to interact with African states. 
The developmental model is an economic and social model in which this research paper 
identifies as being the strategy which has reaped both economic and social successes, as seen 
in the East-Asian economies and in the early development stages in European states. The 
success of the developmental states emphasises taking into consideration the domestic 
realities of the state and the state playing a vital role in development processes. This sort of 
development has been the goal in many states and continues to be the ideal. Western led 
initiatives emphasis diminishing the states as argued before, which counters effort by the state 
to adopt the developmental model desired. On the other hand the Chinese policy of non-
interference emphasises the state as the principle actor and thus allows at least in practices for 
the state to play a leading role in development and entrench the necessary policies needed to 
manifest a successful developmental state. This of course needs political and economic 
disciple and good governance. The research paper argues that giving African states the 
independence to solve their own problems, to believe that it is only the African people who 
live in each state that can sow the seeds for development is vital to allowing successful state 
owned development in African states.  
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The reality is that basically all of todays developed states actively used interventionist trade 
and industrial policies for the purpose of promoting and protecting infant industries during 
“catch-up periods.134 The policies used by every state has been different across different 
states thus proving that the current orthodoxy advocating free trade and laissez-faire 
industrial policies is in contrasts with the historical experience. And that developing countries 
that propagate such a view look is if they are “kicking away the ladder” that they used in 
order to climb up to where they are.” 135 Before discussing the importance of state led 
development it is important to explain what a developmental state is and how it operates. 
 
The Developmental State 
The developmental state is accepted by most academic authors as being the model that many 
East Asian states pursued after the Second World War in their attempt to create a reality that 
allowed for rapid modernisation of their economies.136 The experiment lead to one of the 
greatest industrialisation transformation of the modern era and showed the merits of a system 
or model whereby the state sets specific development goals and then attempt to single-
mindedly mobilise society to achieve the core objective of industrial modernisation.137 The 
unique performance of the East Asian economies such as Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong 
and Singapore that led to extraordinary economic growth which was also consistent with a 
relatively egalitarian distribution of income. The experiences gave empirical evidence of the 
merits in using an outward-oriented model driven by market incentive and a strong private 
sector. The idea of a centralised state that played a significant role in regards to interacting 
with the private sector from a position of pre-eminence so as to manifest a reality which 
focused on developmental objectives became extremely attractive. 138 
A large part of the literature on the dramatic industrialisation in East Asia has been attributed 
to a neo-liberal version of East Asian growth based on the economic benefits of trade 
liberalisation, private enterprise, and a restricted role for the state. But throughout the 1980s 
to the 21 century there has been a growing literature which seeks to refute this neo-liberal 
belief and replace it with a counter-critique which is generally called “institutionalism.”139 
The argument in centred around the belief that the phenomenon of late development should 
be understood as a process in which the realities of the East-Asian states experienced 
economic successes stemming from the strategic role that the state played in taming domestic 
and international markets forces and being able to direct this ability to national interests.140 
The institutionalists’ version argues that the key to rapid industrialization is the constraining 
of market rationality for industrialization and a strong autonomous state. The state plays a 
strategic role in guiding the market by a conception of long term national rationality of 
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investment formulated by government officials. The fundamental reason for rapid growth lies 
in the ability of the state to create a synergy between the state and the market and thus 
manifest an outstanding development reality.141 All of the successful cases of what is 
considered “late industrialisation” have to a large extent been associated with state 
intervention and therefore development can be said to have come about as a result of finding 
the right mixture market orientation and government intervention to manifest efficient and 
rapid industrialisation. 142 
Essentially the developmental states success is depended on a set of institutions and political 
arrangements that are compatible with the appropriate mix of states intervention and market 
orientation in the economy. The developmental state is associated with two components, 
being ideological and structural.143 Ideology is the important element which substantially 
differentiates the developmental state from other forms of states, in that the developmental 
state is one which completely focuses on ensuring economic development, which is generally 
understood to mean high rates of industrialization and accumulation. The state essential 
promotes its legitimacy through its ability to sustain development through high rates of 
economic growth and structural change in the productive system, this development is expect 
to take place both domestically and in its relations with the global community.144 The factors 
which play a significant role in regards to the effectiveness of the developmental states are 
institutional, technical, administrative and political factors. The success of the developmental 
state is thus also connected to its ability to become autonomous from social forces so that it 
can use its capacities to focus and create long-term economic policies that benefit the state 
holistically.145 This would therefore necessitate that such a state should be a strong state that 
is able to gain adhesion of social actors and not use its autonomy in an exploitative manner.   
The developmental state makes a serious attempt at using and focusing its administrative and 
political resources to the goal of economic development, the way in which to measure the 
seriousness of the state attempt at being developmental is by looking at the state’s tax efforts 
and public expenditure patterns.146 One of the most recognised forces seen within the 
developmental states is nationalism, and is usually attached to idea of catching up with 
developed nation’s or\and to secure resources for national defence and security. The 
developmental states play a pivotal role in getting the instruments necessary for development 
such as the connecting of formal and informal networks, forming new formal institutions and 
the utilisation of opportunities for trade and profitable production.147 The state is also able to 
promote macro-economic stability which then in turn creates a reality in which institutional 
frameworks are established that provide aspects such as law and order, effective 
administration of justice and peaceful resolution of conflicts.  
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Developmental State Strategies 
The developmental states, as stated, has usually been associated with first and second 
generation of the newly industrialised economies (NIEs) of East Asia, the first generation 
being Japan and second generation being South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and 
Taiwan.148 The actual reality is that the developmental state in practice was born long before 
it was labelled such, in that over time the developmental states have evolved and can be 
considered to characterise the growth of the Netherlands in the 16th century, England in the 
16th to the 19th century and Germany in the mid19th century the early stage of the 20th 
century.149 Many academic have also argued that many African countries in the post-
independence stage could be seen as being a form of developmental states. Authors such as 
Thandika Mkandawire have argued that African states showed developmental aspirations and 
economic performances but the adoption of the structural development plans in the 1980s and 
1990s heavily diminished the role of the state in economic development in African and thus 
manifest and reality whereby the prospect for the growth and consolidation seen by many 
developmental states globally failed to materialise on the African continent.150 
The concept of the developmental state in its contemporary usage is identified as coming 
from Chalmers Johnson in 1982, which used it to describe the dramatic growth of the 
Japanese economy and the rapid industrialisation which had taken place in Japan after World 
War Two.151 His main argument was that the Japanese “economic miracle” was what he 
termed a planned rational state, which was a developmental state that had the ability to 
proactively support and promote economic development.152 The state is interventionist but 
through a calculated and planned process to bring about clear economic and social goals that 
influence the direction and pace of economic development in the country. This type of state is 
perceived by some to be one which authoritatively and credibly constructs institutional 
architecture within the state and mobilise society towards the realisation of its development 
programme.153 The developmental state is able to avoid any conflict of goals by the absence 
of any commitment to equality and social welfare. The Market is guided with specific 
instruments formulated by a small-scale elite economic bureaucracy who is recruited from the 
best managerial talent available in the system.154 This constructed reality lead to a 
bureaucracy of competent and efficient personnel who, to a large extent, could manifest a 
reality which was beneficial and hugely productive, specifically in its drive for 
industrialisation.155 
It is important with regards to the conceptualisation of the developmental state to understand 
that processes and institutions should not be confused with outcomes and that social 
transformation and successful economic growth are outcome but developmental states may 
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not generate them in all instances. The argument is that developmental state are essentially 
about institutions and their processes and the manner in which they are managed. This is not 
to say that that external factor and interactions with the international community cannot 
distort of have a significant impact on the states outcome but rather that it is expected that 
developmental states would always produce positive development outcomes given normal 
conditions.156 There are many different types of developmental state manifestations with 
cultural peculiarities and thus it can be argued that there is no one size fits all developmental 
state system which can be subscribed by all nations attempting to use the system. 
Developmental states have come about in all cases through trial and error and an 
understanding of their own specific realties and learning the best way in which to implement 
developmental strategies and adapting them successful to obtained desired results. 
Benefits of more China  
The reality is that the conditionality’s have in many ways impeding economic growth in 
African states. The East Asian tiger economies development occurred in a reality in which 
the levels of corruption were often high during the very period whereby there was rapid 
growth and poverty reduction. This development also took place in a reality in which the rule 
of law was far from satisfactory and accountability was also far from the democratic ideals 
set by the West on African states. 157 The argument is not to condone corruption or argue that 
it can facilitate economic growth but rather that growth can still take place in spite of 
corruption. There is a significant amount of evidence and historical proof that shows that 
aspects such as cronyism and graft have been present in every states early stages of capitalist 
government.158 This was seen in many of states such as the United States and the UK during 
the industrial revolution and is now being seen in China today. The realities which now exists 
in many developed state where by civil societies are empowered, corruption is reduced and 
there has been labour reform manifested from a long process of trial and error and was 
promoted primary by grassroots process.159 This reality was not forced by external forces or 
pressure for aspects such as transparency from the World Bank. The idea that African states 
have to adopt ideals and institutions which imitated Western realities is in itself a 
continuations dehumanisation process and a complete disregard for the agency that African 
state have. They has to be a respect of the agency of African state to be able to manifest 
institutions, ideal and more importantly a developmental path that identifies with the reality 
of African people.  
This is not to argue that the West should play role in the path Africa should take but rather 
that it is imperative that it allow African to become responsible for it future, its direction and 
the make-up of political and economic realities. The drive by the West to make African states 
adopt democratic ideal have in reality made less progress than its poverty reduction 
initiatives.160 The historical record show those generations of people within a period of 
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growth had to be subjugated to poor standards of living, in a way as a sacrifice for the single 
minded approach for development. This was the reality in the US and Western states, and in 
many Asian states, including China. China has continued to emphasise, like that of East 
Asian state, that their experience has been that they have had the opportunity to obtain 
substantial economic growth without having to make major progress towards the rule of law 
or much respects to human rights. The West, on the other hand, have continued to argue that 
it does not concern them which development path would be theoretically preferable and that 
they believe that people around the world and desire political empowerment immediately and 
not at some  point in the future. The problem essential stems from the core belief that political 
freedoms should be the primary concerns of all states part of the international community and 
the adoption of democratic, transparent and anti-corruption ideals is a necessary.  
This core belief has thus been in stark contradiction with the experience of the Chinese and 
many of the East Asian states. The Chinese have made it clear that civil and political right are 
secondary concerns and have, within this context, been able to raise the average income of 
the people of China and maintained peace and stability in a country of close to 1, 4 billion 
people. The ability to develop and increase overtime both the standard of living of its people 
of the China and the global economic standing has thus attracted many African states to a 
model that is based on the current and historical reality of the state and its people, rather than 
an externally implemented ideal and Western universal applied plan for development.  
As stated earlier, China has risen to be Africa’s largest trading partners surpassing the United 
States in 2009 and African leaders have continued to ask for more interaction with China 
with various projects been planned in the near future in several African states, such as the 
R84 billion Rand South African infrastructural development of residential, industrial and 
commercial space by Chinese developers Shanghai Zendai.161 The majority of statements 
made by African leaders with regards to Chinese investment have been positive in various 
sectors, motivated by rhetoric of creating equal and mutually beneficial relationships that 
China advocate. Although there have been many problems experienced, as discussed, as the 
relationship continues to mature, there is sufficient evidence that the partners on both sides 
have shown commitment to ensuring this problems are resolved.  
Chinese investment within the 21 century has dramatically increased as African Chinese 
economic relations strengthened. Chinese bilateral trade with Africa went from being 11 
billion dollars in 2000 and has increased to 210 billion dollars in 2013.162 This investment has 
been important for the goal that all African states desire, which is to unlock their potential 
through infrastructure investment to increase trade both internationally and among member 
countries. African states have long identified sectors such as energy, water, sanitation, 
telecoms and transport as being infrastructure setbacks.163 One of Africa’s biggest problems 
continues to be energy supply, with the lack of infrastructure leading to 30 countries 
experiencing frequent power outages and only a little over one third of Africa’s populations 
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having access to electricity.164 The cost of the lack of infrastructure on African development 
has been significant, costing each member country an estimate 2% growth a year and cut 
productivity by as much as 40%. 165 The World Bank has stated that Africa will need an 
estimated 93 billion dollars annually to be able to fund infrastructure projects for the next 10 
years.166 This averages about 15% of Africa’s gross domestic product and 60 billion dollars 
of this funding would be used in new projects with the rest going to maintenance of existing 
infrastructure.  
These have been the exact investments that China has made across the African continent. 
And thus emphasises the opportunity that China presents for Africa and the value of their 
relationship in increasing both the standard of living and the gross domestic products of 
African states. China has become the number one investor in infrastructure in Africa, with its 
investment in infrastructure standing at 13 billion dollars in 2012.167 This was more than 
three times the amount of the second largest investor in African infrastructure, being the 
World Bank, of 4 billion dollars. China has also promised 20 billion in loans for 
infrastructure development.168 
The West has continuously vilified the role of China in Africa, choosing to call it one of 
exploitation embedded in propping up authoritarian African leaders. But the reality has 
shown that this has not been the case, with China building much needed relationships with 
African states and has presented opportunities of development. There have been many 
African nations, both democratic and authoritarian, that have emphasised the importance of 
Sino-African relation to the development of their states. The president of Senegal, Abdoulaye 
Wade, emphasised this point when he published an op-ed in the “financial times” that has 
now become a prominent piece on the website of the Chinese Embassy in South Africa 
whereby he praises the pragmatic approach to Chinese investment in Senegal.169 He then goes 
on to say that… 
The Chinese model for stimulating rapid economic development has much to teach Africa. 
With direct aid, credit lines and reasonable contracts, China has helped African nations 
build infrastructure projects in record time—bridges, roads, schools, hospitals, dams, 
legislative buildings, stadiums and airports. In many African nations, including Senegal, 
improvements in infrastructure have played important roles in stimulating economic 
growth… It is a telling sign of the post-colonial mind-set that some donor organisations in 
the west dismiss the trade agreements between Chinese banks and African states that produce 
these vital improvements—as though Africa was naïve enough to just offload its precious 
natural resources at bargain prices to obtain a commitment for another stadium or state 
house… I have found that a contract that would take five years to discuss, negotiate and sign 
with the World Bank, takes three months when we have dealt with Chinese authorities. I am a 
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firm believer in good governance and the rule of law. But when bureaucracy and senseless 
red tape impede our ability to act—and when poverty persists while international 
functionaries drag their feet—African leaders have an obligation to opt for swifter 
solutions.170 
The president highlights an important point which has been heard in the rhetoric of most if 
not all African states that have interacted with China, being that although they may be 
problems, Chinese engagement continues to be attractive because China continues to 
communicate ideas of mutual benefit and a shared colonial history. Chinese rhetoric has been 
devoid of all demeaning and patronising language communicated by the West and has 
replaced that with a language of mutual economic benefit and partnership on equal grounds. 
Most importantly their policy of non-interference that speaks of independent development, 
departing from the crippling practice of Western development program, is seen as giving 
African states a possibility of adopted a new approach of international interaction that can 
correct the damage that the West has inflicted on many African economies. The Chinese 
example of development is held up as a prototype of what independent development that 
takes in to consideration the domestic realities and implements developmental ideal can 
manifest. China is developing state with a colonial history, which not so long ago had 85% of 
its population living under the poverty line. The reality is far different now with China going 
through what many consider to be the greatest development process in modern history thus 
attracting the developing world, in particular Africa, to learn from their experience. This 
reality, the history of the unity of the of the non-aligned movement at the Bandung 
conference and the 21st century rhetoric, led by China, of South-South cooperation and 
solidarity repeated in Chinese speeches and conferences is fundamentally more attractive 
then Western interactions.  
Conclusion 
It is very important not to make sweeping statements when referring to Africa and the 
research paper has tried not to do that, giving rhetoric and realities from different African 
states and leaders. As the research paper has discussed, China is the largest economy in the 
world, in terms of purchasing power parity, and one of the biggest creditors in the world. This 
makes Chinese interaction almost necessary in Africa, whereby many states are in need of 
infrastructural and social and economic development. African states have the opportunity 
depart from a solely Eurocentric development program and maximise the benefits of their 
partnership with China. What will be vital is for African governments to articulate their own 
comprehensive China policy, which includes strategies for engagement that do not solely 
focus on natural resources.171 African states should create a more conducive environment for 
Chinese investment into the manufacturing sector thus allowing for the creation of more jobs 
for the native people. 
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African states will also have the opportunity to gain access to other Asian markets thus 
having the opportunity to better diversify the continents export products. The reality is that 
China will continue to remain an important trading partner and looks to be growing even 
stronger in economic strength. Taking this into account African states will need to find ways 
to maximise on its relationship with China to spur economic growth and development 
therefore creating the conditions to reduce poverty and reduce employment.   
The research paper has argued that the current Western led international standard of 
civilisation is essentially exploitative and that the West has in many ways used democracy as 
a masquerade for “empire building”. African states, as well as the developing world, have 
been negatively impacted by Western led initiatives and programs. And almost all attempts at 
integrating developing states into the neo-liberal standard have failed to produce positive 
outcomes. Structural adjustment programs, the ideal of Washington consensus and good 
governance all attempted to make developing state adopt neo-liberal political and economic 
ideals which did not take into consideration internal realities of the state imposed with these 
programs. The paper went on at length to show the connections to this rhetoric with 
Eurocentric historical rhetoric that communicated ideas of civilising “the other”.  
What has thus been attractive about the Chinese policy of non-interference is the 
independence and change in rhetoric that speaks of mutual development and non-interference 
in the state developmental path. China essentially commits to the ideals set by all developing 
states at the Bandung Conference in 1954 that promised to base interactions on non- 
interference, mutual respect and collective development. These interactions were not based 
on exploitation or a colonial relationship but rather they were seen as a partnership in growth. 
Sino-African relations have also, importantly, created a reality in which China has pressured 
the West to pay much more attention to African government then they have before. This was 
emphasised by an Angolan minister who state that: 
“Our relations with China not only allowed us to obtain large loans, but most importantly it 
forced the West to treat us with more respect and in a less patronizing way. For that we are 
grateful.”172 
China has established themselves and their embassies in more African states than the 
European Union or the United States, even establishing embassies in African states with no 
strategically important resources. This help to build the image of a China working in 
partnership with African states to develop a more equitable global reality. The Chinese policy 
of non-interference gives an alternative that pressures the West to recognise that it has not 
been getting development in Africa correct. The alterative of rapid growth at any cost model 
has been embraced by many African leaders. It gives them the independence to create their 
own development path based on the social, political and economic reality of their own state 
thus giving them a sense of ownership which has not be given before.  
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The research paper has emphasised that it is ironic that the very nations that divided up Africa 
and its people at the Berlin Conference in 1884 are now accusing China of acting in similar 
colonial fashion they once did. The reality has been that the majority of African leaders view 
the Chinese approach as being a far more attractive economic development model than the 
Washington consensus and Western ideal of good governance. China has continued to make 
it clear that it seeks to boost and develop its relationship with Africa. China is not only the 
number one trading partner with Africa but many other states around the world, estimating 
about 125 states around the world.173 The question therefore arises to why the same criticism 
and disapproval is not raised with all the states across the world in which China has dealings 
with that they get with interactions with African states. China has consistently used the policy 
of non-interference in all state it is involved in with therefore showing that it is possible that 
the West disapproval of Chinese interaction with African states may not stem from policy 
disagreements but rather the fear of Chinese dominance and the diminishment of their 
standard of Western civilization which is now being questioned and challenged, and also the 
fear of losing the type of access they have had to African natural resources.  
The research paper has continuously reiterated that the neo-liberal agenda is Eurocentric in 
nature and setting conditions in African states to adopt these principles integrated them into a 
system which was not beneficial for African states but in many ways strengthened the 
hegemonic advantage of the West over African states, a region with 2/3 of the world 
resources. The Chinese policy of non-interference creates and opportunity for African states 
to move away from this type of relationship and develop relationship that are fairer, more 
equal and take into consideration the domestic realities of the state. 
There is no doubt that China’s economic rise is shaping the international order by introducing 
a new development paradigm as well as introducing a new model of political and economic 
interaction with African states. The Chinese policy of non-interference has definitely created 
an alternative model of engaging with African states, putting into question the necessity of 
ideas like rule of law and democracy. This engagement has given hope and the possibility of 
African states developing a developmental approach that is driven by the desire to have 
equitable and high quality growth. China has given an example and provides an opportunity 
for African states in particular to develop their economies in a truly independent way and 
project their own political choices. The neo-liberal conditionality’s set by Western states have 
continuously failed and have had devastating outcome in many developing states. China’s 
policy of non-interference challenges the idea of neo-liberalism and Western imitation; it 
presents Africans with an alternative that they have embraced and allows them to finally 
engage in the process of independent state led development that takes into considerations the 
social, political and economic realities of the state. The Policy is thus argued to have far more 
benefits than disadvantages and allows the opportunity for a Sino-African relationship that 
can be described as a partnership in growth.  
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